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Despite decentralisation and local control over policy being a ubiquitous feature of human 
rights governance globally, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child focuses primarily on 
the State as the locus for implementation of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
State control and a regulative approach prioritising justiciability of the CRC at national level 
are the Committee’s dominant responses to decentralisation.  This paper introduces the context 
of decentralisation, including the risks and potential gains for implementation of the CRC. It is 
contended that the regulative approach contemplated by the Committee may prove particularly 
challenging in the context of decentralisation. It is suggested that a normative approach, in 
which legislation is used to promote compliance through cultural acceptance of the CRC, and 
to support localisation of children and young people’s rights, may be better suited to the 
contours of decentralised governance. Taking the example of Wales, a devolved territory in the 
 2 
United Kingdom, it will be shown how a primarily normative approach to legal integration can 
help mainstream international norms in policy development, enhance accountability for rights, 
and provide opportunities for policy advocacy at a local level. The paper is a contribution to 
the literature on the instrumental value of legislation to support the realisation of human rights, 
applicable to decentralised systems of governance. 
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Obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) are imposed on States 
Parties, accordingly a State government is required to respect, protect and fulfil the CRC rights 
of all children and young people within its jurisdiction.1 Yet in many States worldwide 
decentralisation or devolution is the context for implementation of the CRC and, although 
arrangements vary, a common feature of decentralisation is the transfer of State power over 
policy that impacts on the lives of children and young people from central State institutions, to 
administrations at regional or local level,2 making governance of the CRC a matter of local 
responsibility.3 Despite its ubiquity as an aspect of governance of children and young people’s 
rights globally, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (the ‘Committee’) focuses 
primarily on State government as the locus for implementation, with States encouraged to adopt 




This paper first introduces the context of decentralisation, including the risks and potential 
gains for implementation of the CRC. It will then focus on the Committee’s recommendation 
that the CRC be incorporated in national legal systems. It is contended that the regulative 
approach contemplated by the Committee may prove particularly challenging in the context of 
decentralisation. It is suggested that a normative approach, in which legislation is used to 
promote compliance through (institutional) cultural acceptance of the CRC, and to support 
localisation of children and young people’s rights, may be better suited to the contours of 
decentralised governance. After discussing aspects of regulative and normative approaches to 
legal integration of human rights to provide a conceptual and analytical framework, the paper 
introduces a case study on legal integration of the CRC at a level below the State party. Taking 
the example of Wales, a devolved territory in the United Kingdom (UK), it will be shown how 
a primarily normative approach to legal integration can help mainstream international norms 
in policy development, enhance accountability for rights, and provide opportunities for policy 
advocacy at a local level. While the focus is on implementation of the CRC, the case study 
provides generalisable insights, and is a contribution to the literature on the instrumental value 
of legislation to support the realisation of human rights in decentralised systems of governance.  
 
Decentralisation: A context for children’s rights 
The dominant arrangement for governance in many States worldwide is decentralisation.5 
Arrangements vary but typically provide for local control, in some cases including legislative 
competence, in policy areas such as health, education, housing and welfare, often accompanied 
by fiscal decentralisation.6 In a number of States therefore the levers of control over policies 
that affect how children and young people experience their rights guaranteed by the CRC, in 
particular their social and economic rights, are in the hands of devolved administrations. This 
introduces both risks and opportunities. Risks include: low priority accorded to children and 
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young people’s rights by local administrations, especially where locally elected politicians may 
be more concerned to meet the needs of adult constituents in order to maintain themselves in 
power;7 limited resources to support implementation (when compared with resources available 
to State governments), blurred lines of accountability, and discrimination as children and young 
people experience their rights differently based on territorial distinction.8 Inconsistent 
implementation of the CRC across internal administrations was identified as an issue in a  study 
of legal implementation of the CRC for UNICEF in 2012; as was dilution of State responsibility 
for children and young people’s rights where implementation takes place largely under local 
control.9 The Committee is alert to these risks. Referring to decentralization and devolution 
without distinction, it has emphasized that such arrangements do not reduce the direct 
responsibility of States governments to meet their CRC obligations across the whole of their 
jurisdiction, irrespective of internal governance structures.10 Although a range of measures of 
implementation suitable for use at all levels of government have been identified, an upward 
solution emphasising State government control, planning and coordination, and national legal 
regulation are the Committee’s primary responses to decentralisation.11  
 
While decentralisation introduces risks for CRC implementation, there are also potential gains. 
Decentralisation is often argued on efficiency grounds as leading to better services and 
improved accountability.12 Where service planning and delivery are in the hands of local 
administrations, planners are usually closer to users, civil society and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). This has potential to facilitate contributions to policy development by 
local stakeholders with experience of local need, expertise in discrete areas of policy, and 
insight into how to make best use of local resources.13 Close proximity relations are also seen 
as enhancing accountability, as decisions-makers are likely to be more visible and accessible 
to service users or their representatives.14 While these claims are difficult to establish 
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empirically, it is claimed that decentralisation increases the opportunities available for local 
people, NGOs and others to contribute practise experience to scrutinise policy and bring 
forward alternatives, as well as to act as advocates for reform and hold local institutions to 
account.15 These are precisely the sort of opportunities the Committee says should be available 
to children and young people, or their representatives.16  
 
Incorporation: A regulative approach to CRC integration  
The Committee, in common with other UN human rights treaty bodies, engages primarily with 
States Parties on matters of treaty compliance. But the international regime is not endowed 
with the means to impose any significant penalty for breach of obligations, and there are doubts 
about the utility of international mechanisms to bring about real change in the way States 
behave.17 It is unsurprising therefore that the Committee has called for incorporation of the 
CRC so that it is fully justiciable and enforceable before national courts, and given 
predominance when in conflict with national law, policy or practice, and a remedy provided 
where rights are violated.18 Incorporation of the sort contemplated by the Committee would 
provide the hard-edged regulative environment for CRC implementation at national level that 
is lacking at international level. However, while integration in national legal systems clearly 
has a function to promote behaviours that deliver CRC consistent policy outcomes, there are a 
number of objections to a regulative approach which relies on individual claims litigation to 
achieve this. Amongst these are well-rehearsed arguments concerning the justiciability of 
social and economic rights, including whether unelected judges should interfere with resource 
allocative decisions taken in the political domain.19 Judicial reticence to trespass onto the 
perceived terrain of elected politicians is certainly a feature of the legal landscape in the UK.20 
This was recently confirmed in R (SG and others) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,21 
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in which a majority of the UK Supreme Court was unwilling to declare government policy on 
welfare reform unlawful, despite its negative impact on children and young people’s rights.  
 
While the case for enforcement and justiciability of all CRC rights is often convincingly made 
in the literature, this is contested.22 In any event, children and young people face particular 
challenges accessing court-based remedies where their rights are violated. These include 
inadequate resources, and reliance on others to act on their behalf where capacity is in issue.23 
Although the Committee has recommended States introduce measures to support children and 
young people to claim their rights through legal proceedings, they remain marginalised in 
justice systems.24 As Williams observes, obtaining CRC compatible policy outcomes through 
the courts is likely to be a ‘hard and tortuous business’ even in States where there has been 
progress on incorporation of social and economic rights.25 She notes that securing judicial 
enforcement of the CRC in full in some legal systems is not merely a conceptual issue but, for 
children and young people, a practical one.26  
 
The context of decentralisation introduces additional challenges to a regulative approach to 
ensuring compliance with the CRC through national law and enforcement by the courts. 
Decentralisation is a manifestation of legitimate claims by regions within a State to a degree of 
independence, and is consistent with several principles of international human rights.27 A State 
imposed regulatory framework requiring local compliance with international human rights 
places limits on devolved sovereignty. Reflecting on the issue in the context of devolution in 
Scotland, Himsworth comments that while ‘devolutionary democracy is enhanced by the 
addition of a human rights dimension’, there is nonetheless an ‘element of tempering of the 
devolution project by the human rights project’.28 Tensions are likely to arise between these 
‘projects’ where policy divergence takes place as a predictable and legitimate outcome of 
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devolution.29 The probability is that these tensions will emerge in precisely those policy areas 
where discretion is typically given to local administrations. These are areas where difficult 
decisions often need to be made about the allocation of scarce resources, and where 
disagreements often arise in the political domain about how best to meet competing priorities, 
including rights-based priorities. International human rights in these areas, including under the 
CRC, are often indeterminate (see below), and there is scope for disputation about how best to 
realise their objectives. Under a regulative approach States governments may seek to rely on 
human rights arguments to impose their will on local administrations: whether as a 
consequence of disagreement, or in pursuit of a centralising agenda. In either scenario, there is 
the possibility of disruption of the sovereignty relations anticipated by devolution.  
 
Disruption of sovereignty at devolved level may be justified to provide a ‘floor of rights’ to 
ensure that regional governments do not violate human rights.30 It might also be assumed that 
human rights uniformity should be a matter of constitutional significance, enforced by a 
national Supreme Court.31 However, a legal regime inclined toward State human rights 
isomorphism risks denuding many human rights, including under the CRC, of a key asset. In 
common with other human rights treaties, many of the guarantees set out in the CRC are drafted 
at a level of abstraction to make them suitable to a wide range of settings.32 In the context of 
decentralisation this is an opportunity for stakeholders, including children and young people, 
to contribute locally relevant understandings of CRC obligations to inform policy 
development.33 However, in a regulative environment which relies on court-based 
determination the flexibility inherent in human rights may be seen as problematic. The 
proscription that accompanies legal application of rights invites delineation by the courts, 
undermining local interpretation and applicability. The risk is that rights under the CRC will 
lose their ‘transformative effect’ and will become petrified into a ‘legalistic paradigm’ if local 
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officials become more concerned with regulatory compliance than with local application and 
relevance.34 From this there is the potential for a regulative environment to produce a chilling 
effect on the policy process if CRC interpretation is dominated by ‘technocrats’ (legal 
professionals or officials), limiting the opportunities to mobilise the CRC to inspire imaginative 
policy solutions.35  
 
A normative approach: Making the CRC locally relevant  
An alternative to court-based compliance mechanisms for implementation of the CRC is one 
which relies on the ‘persuasive power of legitimate legal obligations’.36  In this normative 
model of compliance CRC consistent policy outcomes are a consequence of a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’,37 with a ‘de-emphasis of formal enforcement measures… except in egregious 
cases’.38 The essence of the approach is an iterative discourse in which the meaning and content 
of rights becomes locally understood, and have a causal influence on policy outcomes.39 A 
normative approach to CRC implementation has much in common with the localisation of 
human rights.  De Feyter, discussing the concept of localisation as a response to globalisation, 
sees local need as the ‘starting point both for further interpretation and elaboration of human 
rights norms, and the development of human rights action at all level’.40 Under a normative 
approach and the localisation paradigm international legal norms are not treated as the basis 
for a legal claim, but as a framework for effective policy and action.41 Rights-holders and policy 
advocates will mobilise international norms to promote change through the introduction of a 
human rights perspective into policy-making,42 including as justification for deviation from 
State policies.43  
 
The preferred response to human rights needs through localisation is that they are dealt with in 
close proximity to the sites where needs emerge.44 This provides a link to the context of 
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decentralisation as human rights needs arise in a specific geographic location, which will often 
be the context for public policy in devolved systems.45 Localisation of the CRC begins with 
‘cultural acceptance’ of the idea that children and young people have rights, and thereafter 
integration into the practices of local administration. 46 As in a normative approach, the articles 
of the CRC are deployed to convince local policy-makers that practices must change, and to 
reform policy.47 Local NGOs, using their knowledge of local need and informed by the CRC, 
will develop policy options for selection by policy-makers, who will have to be persuaded to 
adopt preferred options.48 Decentralisation provides a unique opportunity to undertake policy 
advocacy through local ‘interpretive communities’ made up of policy-makers and NGOs, with 
participation by children and young people or their representatives.49 Tobin, discussing 
interpretive communities from the perspective of international treaty implementation, notes 
that participants can take account of factors that apply locally, including any resource 
constraints on devolved administrations. Taking account of constraints, as well as needs and 
obligations, is more likely to result in locally negotiated policy options being seen as legitimate 
by all concerned.50 The involvement of local NGOs and National Human Rights Institutions in 
interpretive  communities, in particular those with links to the international sphere, is vital to 
‘navigate between the local and the global’ in order to bridge the gap between the international 
regime and local application of human rights.51 The Committee is distant from the sites where 
children and young people experience their rights, and any disconnect between local policy 
and the Committee’s outputs has the potential to undermine the CRC’s legitimacy at local 
level.52 Localisation in the context of decentralisation is an obvious opportunity for 
‘transformation of the global discourse’ of human rights, including under the CRC, to the local 
environment.53 This transformative process enhances the legitimacy of the CRC as 
international human rights become the demands of children and young people at local level.54 
To improve the effectiveness of localisation practices, mechanisms need to be available to 
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support interactive dialogues and ‘deliberative engagement’ to deliver a locally relevant 
understanding of CRC obligations, including mechanisms that engage children and young 
people. 55 These are more likely to be available in the context of decentralisation, and may 
already be a feature of local governance. This is what has been attempted in Wales, and is 
discussed later in this paper.  
 
Supporting CRC implementation: Functions of Legislation   
Legislation is a quintessentially regulative device. In the context of a normative approach to 
CRC implementation however, it may be used to promote structures and practices to support 
implementation.56 A function of (devolved) legislation therefore might be to frame the policy 
environment in which this takes place, so that policy decision-making proceeds by reference 
to objectives introduced by legislation: including the possibility of human rights objectives. 
This has several aspects, a number of which are relevant to the discussion of developments in 
Wales set out below. First is to confirm internationally accepted guarantees of protection and 
entitlements for children and young people as the legitimate objectives of policy at local level. 
This is partly symbolic, but also establishes an expectation which authorises the use of rights-
based compliance language in policy advocacy. Stakeholders are able to identify relevant duty-
bearers and make claims for compliance.57 Second is to establish rules to govern the discretion 
of public officials (Ministers and their officials) involved in policy development.58 These rules, 
although contained in legislation, need not imply application by lawyers or the courts. Rather 
legislation contributes the basic elements of an institutional environment, through ‘structural 
templates and action scripts’ that guide work on policy.59 Third, legislation can confirm the 
reference points for officials involved in policy decision-making, including the Committee’s 
textual output: general comments, reports on days of discussion, and concluding observations 
on State Parties’ reports.60 Fourth, as the effectiveness of a normative approach is partly 
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dependent on the involvement of children and young people, and other stakeholders, legislation 
can introduce mechanisms that engage a range of participants in policy development.  
 
As a normative approach relies on acceptance of CRC obligations without recourse to judicial 
enforcement, there is the potential that it will be adopted as a policy framework but will not be 
used as the actual basis for policy. In this scenario children and young people’s rights are likely 
to be ‘decoupled’ from practice and any stated commitment to the CRC will be little more than 
‘window-dressing’.61 Legislation can therefore be used to strengthen accountability 
mechanisms to expose any failure to use the CRC as a policy framework. Additional 
accountability opportunities might include: complaints procedures; review by National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs), including children’s commissioners where these are established; 
and, opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny.62 While a normative approach places limited 
reliance on judicial enforcement, Williams suggests that legislation might also provide a 
supervisory role for the courts as a ‘backstop to bespoke political and administrative 
machinery’ designed to ensure that the objectives of the CRC are met primarily through close 
attention in policy development.63 The approach in Wales has sought to deploy legislative 
devices to promote a normative approach to CRC implementation, while retaining regulative 
elements to enhance accountability mechanisms.  
 
The CRC in Wales  
Since 1999 and devolution to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there has been scope for 
devolved administrations in these territories to follow their own direction on policy affecting 
children and young people. The National Assembly for Wales (NAW) has legislative 
competence in a number of areas relevant to the CRC, including: health, housing, education, 
and social care.64 The Welsh Government exercises executive powers that largely mirror the 
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competences of the NAW, with control over a fixed annual budget.65 The contours of Welsh 
devolution are not unusual, and will be a feature of decentralisation in many States. A particular 
aspect of UK devolution is that devolved administrations are prohibited from acting in a 
manner which is not compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998, which gives effect to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in UK law.66 This limitation, which is not 
imposed on the UK Parliament,67 establishes the outer limits of devolved competences, 
providing a safeguard against human rights violation. However, it offers no guidance on how 
the devolved administrations should give effect to human rights obligations incumbent on the 
UK, either under the ECHR or other international instruments. There is then considerable scope 
for the devolved administrations to take diverse approaches to CRC sensitive policy areas.68  
 
Differences in policy approach between the UK and Wales in the field of children and young 
people have been apparent since the outset of devolution. In contrast to the UK government, 
the NAW and the Welsh Government have used the language of rights and entitlements in 
policy documents and legislation.69 Although perhaps an inevitable consequence of devolution, 
the divergence in the approach to the CRC in policy between government in Wales and in the 
UK means that children are likely to experience their rights differently depending on where 
they live in the UK. This is consistent with findings from the UNICEF study referred to above, 
and is amongst the challenges of decentralisation identified by the Committee. 70 In 2008 the 
Committee expressed its concern at the lack of national coordination of implementation of the 
CRC in the UK, and again when the UK was examined by the Committee in 2014.71 (This issue 
has been identified not only in the UK but for other States where some form of regional 
autonomy is a significant feature of constitutional arrangements and CRC governance72). 
Despite this, the approach taken in Wales was noted with approval by the Committee when the 
UK was examined in 2008. However, the Committee identified an implementation gap between 
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political rhetoric and policy affecting children and young people.73 Although the willingness 
of Welsh governance institutions to engage with the CRC offered the possibility of a local 
solution to this problem, the Committee’s response was to urge the UK to incorporate the CRC 
in national law and take a lead on national planning.74 While the Committee may have 
overlooked an opportunity to connect its recommendations to the context of Welsh devolution, 
the Welsh Government was keen to strengthen its commitment to children and young people’s 
rights through law. In 2010 a proposal for legislation was introduced to the NAW, and in 2011 
the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011 (the ‘Measure’) received 
Royal Assent. The Measure is the first, and to date the only general legislative measure of 
implementation of the CRC in the UK. It came into partial effect on 1st May 2012, and has been 
in full effect since 1st May 2014.75 
 
The development of the Measure was characterised by a high level of engagement between 
Welsh Government and the Wales UNCRC Monitoring Group (the ‘Monitoring Group’), a 
civil society network, with participation (as observers) by the Children’s Commissioner for 
Wales (CCfW), the Equalities and Human Rights Commission in Wales (EHRC), and Welsh 
Government officials.76 In a highly unusual step (unlikely outside the context of devolution), 
the Monitoring Group was invited to put forward a proposal for legislation to the Welsh 
Government. Convinced that the implementation gap was attributable to a lack of attention to 
the CRC in policy development, the Monitoring Group took the view that a regulative approach 
giving a reactive remedy to rights violation would be unlikely to deliver an effective solution 
to low prioritisation of the CRC in policy development. The Monitoring Group favoured 
legislation to embed the CRC in policy processes at an early stage, and so legislation was 
suggested – and was enacted as the Measure – to promote cultural acceptance of the CRC as 
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an aspect of policy-making within the Welsh Government, and to support local mobilisation of 
children and young people’s rights.  
 
The Measure 
The primary mechanism to embed the CRC in policy under the Measure is a duty on the Welsh 
Ministers to have due regard to Part 1 of the CRC when exercising any of their functions (the 
‘due regard duty’).77 This enshrines the CRC as part of the framework for policy development 
in Wales, and places children and young people’s rights to the fore.78 The essence of the 
approach is to promote a culture in which the CRC is routinely taken into account and causally 
influential on policy outcomes. Ministers have to reflect on relevant articles of the CRC when 
considering proposals for policy, and how they can exercise their functions to give better effect 
to children and young people’s rights.79 The Measure confirms the CRC as the basis for policy 
on children and young people in Wales by making attention to their rights a condition of 
legitimacy of policy outputs in Wales. The Measure further encourages adoption of the CRC 
into policy decision-making by requiring Ministers to publish a ‘children’s scheme’ (the 
‘Scheme’), setting out arrangements they have made for securing compliance with the due 
regard duty.80 Significantly, within six months of the Committee making any recommendation 
based on a UK periodic report, Ministers must consider whether the Scheme should be 
amended to reflect this, and when preparing (or remaking) the Scheme they must have regard 
to the Committee’s textual output.81 Ministers are also required to involve children and young 
people, the CCfW, and any other relevant persons they identify (which could include the 
Monitoring Group, other NGOs, or the EHRC) in the preparation of the Scheme, a draft of 
which must be laid before the NAW.82 These requirements provide an excellent opportunity 
for children and young people, and other stakeholders, to debate and directly influence policy 
development at the highest level in Wales.83  As the CCfW is linked to European and wider 
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networks of commissioners, and many local NGOs will be part of European or regional 
organisations, the Measure introduces channels through which the CRC can flow from the 
international to the local. Ministers also have an obligation to report periodically to the NAW 
on compliance, once again giving an opportunity for debate and scrutiny.84 The maximum 
period between reports is five years (to coincide with UK State party reporting to the 
Committee), but this may be shortened by the Scheme.85 Currently a report is required every 
two-and-a-half years.86  
 
The Impact of the Measure  
The Measure sits amongst a number of interconnected mechanisms that support children and 
young people’s rights in Wales. These include: other statutes;87 international, national and local 
networks that inform Welsh Government policy;88 the work of the CCfW and EHRC; and 
developments at international, European and UK levels on integration of the CRC through 
law.89 It would be extremely difficult to disentangle the causal impact(s) of the Measure from 
these and other factors influencing policy on children and young people in Wales, requiring a 
sophisticated methodology beyond the scope of this paper. Instead discussion will be confined 
to more general impacts. 
 
An important impact of the Measure has been to enhance legal and parliamentary 
accountability for children and young people’s rights in Wales.90 Legal accountability has been 
strengthened as compliance with the due regard duty is a public law function, the exercise of 
which is amenable to challenge by way of judicial review in the Administrative Court. The due 
regard formula is borrowed from UK equalities enactments and case-law under these 
enactments gives guidance on the procedural and substantive content of the duty.91 Case law 
confirms that having due regard means a decision-maker must be properly informed, must 
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attend to the substance of a decision paying attention to any specified objectives, and take 
account of relevant evidence; the duty must be rigorously exercised and integrated within the 
discharge of public functions.92 In addition factors taken into account by the courts on judicial 
review are: the weight attached to different policy priorities, and the balance struck between 
competing, or even complementary, interests. Children and young people, and others with 
sufficient interest will be able to look to the courts to hold the Welsh Ministers to account for 
compliance with the due regard duty, and how they have taken the CRC into account in policy 
decision-making. The Measure therefore adds a new basis for judicial review of Welsh 
Government policy on children and young people. Importantly, the Measure draws down the 
CRC into Welsh law so that judges deciding cases on compliance with the due regard duty may 
be called on to consider the meaning of rights under the CRC, as an aspect of forming a view 
on whether due regard has been had to it.93 Through this process it is possible that developed 
understandings of the rights guaranteed by the CRC will emerge in the context of Wales. While 
it is not anticipated that judicial review will be a regular occurrence, and there is no reported 
case where the due regard duty has been relied on, there is some evidence that legal 
practitioners are considering how it might be used as a basis to challenge Ministers on policy 
decisions.94 And in Re P-S, a case in which the right of a child or young person to be heard in 
proceedings was considered, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that in the future the approach 
taken by the courts to cases in Wales may be different because the CRC has become part of 
Welsh law.95 However, in practice, other accountability mechanisms are likely to have greater 
currency, including ‘parliamentary’ scrutiny by the NAW.  
 
A number of opportunities are provided by the Measure for the NAW to scrutinise Ministers 
on children and young people’s rights in policy development in Wales. For example, when a 
Scheme is published in draft, or following a compliance report; or, in plenary or committee 
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sessions when policy is being discussed by the NAW. This could encompass any matter 
relevant to the CRC, including whether the Committee’s recommendations have been properly 
taken into account. A factor relevant to the effectiveness of parliamentary accountability under 
the Measure is the willingness of NAW members to engage in rigorous questioning of 
Ministers. To date members, and in particular the Children, Young People and Education 
Committee (the ‘CYPEC’), have made some good use of the due regard duty to hold Ministers 
to account.96 A recent example will illustrate the point. In 2017 the Welsh Government 
introduced draft legislation to improve educational provision for children and young people 
with additional learning needs in Wales. The task of scrutinising the legislation was undertaken 
by the CYPEC. A number of stakeholders contended during scrutiny of the draft bill that the 
Ministerial due regard duty required Ministers to ensure that those exercising functions under 
the legislation are also under a duty to have due regard to the CRC.97 The CYPEC took up the 
point, and recommended that the Welsh Government introduce an amendment to require 
anyone exercising functions under the legislation to have due regard to the CRC.98 Initially this 
was not accepted. However, the CYPEC and others, such as the CCfW, continued to argue the 
case using various channels of communication with Ministers, relying on the due regard duty. 
This lobbying proved successful, and resulted in a Welsh Government amendment to the 
legislation to place a duty on responsible authorities to have due regard to the CRC.99 
 
The Measure has also introduced new opportunities for civil society stakeholders to hold 
Ministers to account for compliance with the CRC. NGOs, the CCfW and EHRC, the Public 
Service Ombudsperson, and the Auditor General for Wales, are able to use the due regard duty 
as a basis to challenge Ministers on issues relating to children and young people’s rights in 
Wales. To date some NGOs, and the CCfW have made effective use of the due regard duty to 
underpin scrutiny of Ministers. Notably the CCfW in particular has sought to make use of the 
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due regard duty to hold the Welsh Government to account, deploying it as the basis to critique 
policy against the framework of the CRC, and to underpin advocacy for alternative policy 
solutions.100 Again a recent example will help illustrate the point generally. This relates to the 
Welsh Government’s response to the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit). 
Initially the priorities identified for Wales by Ministers failed to expressly recognise the need 
to protect the interests of children and young people.101 This was raised by civil society 
members of the Welsh Government coordinated Children’s Rights Advisory Group (CRAG). 
CRAG has a standing membership drawn from the NGO and academic sectors, UNICEF, and 
the CCfW and is established to advise Ministers via their officials on CRC compliance in 
Wales.102 CRAG members were able to write directly to the relevant Minister pointing out that 
the duty to have due regard applies to Ministerial participation in any Brexit process, and that 
Article 12 of the CRC requires Ministers to consult with children and young people about 
priorities for a post-Brexit Wales.103 This argument was accepted in a subsequent policy paper 
on Brexit, which refers directly to the need to consult with children and young people, and  
funds being made available to support a consultation process.104 
 
The above examples illustrate how stakeholders have found new opportunities for 
accountability and advocacy using the Measure as a bulwark to engage with Ministers. In 
addition, the Measure has provided leverage to influence how policy on children and young 
people is carried out in Wales.  A Child Rights Impact Assessment (CRIA)105 has been 
introduced by the Scheme for all policy proposals. This was introduced following consultation 
with stakeholders during preparation of the first Scheme in 2011,106 and reflects the 
Committee’s recommendation that CRIA should be applied to all policy which will have an 
impact on children and young people.107 The Welsh Government’s report on compliance with 
the due regard duty in 2015 claimed a ‘substantial increase’ in number of CRIAs carried out in 
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the period after the Measure came into full effect in May 2014.108 This is confirmed by 
available data in the 2018 report, in which the Welsh Government further claimed that ‘CRIA 
is now an intrinsic part of policy making processes’.109 The 2015 report also claims that the use 
of CRIA has contributed to embedding children and young people’s rights in policy and to the 
emergence of an ‘ingrained culture of thinking about children’s rights in the Welsh 
Government’, while recognising that further ‘cultural change’ has to take place.110 The report 
points at a number of policies which it claims were influenced by CRIA resulting in better 
policy for children and young people. These include changes to legislation on well-being in 
Wales to require the interests of ‘children’ to be identified in local well-being assessments,111 
and guidance issued pursuant to legislation to promote ‘active travel’ to ensure children and 
young people are able to engage in healthy activities such as walking and cycling.112 In the 
2018 compliance report, data from the Welsh Government confirm that CRIA is in use across 
a range of departments, not simply those directly involved with policy on children and young 
people.113 An evaluation of CRIA by the author of this paper in 2015 partially confirms the 
claims made by the Welsh Government. It found that CRIA had contributed to increased 
visibility and awareness of the CRC within the Welsh Government, and had resulted in some 
better policy outcomes for children and young people.114 However, the evaluation also 
identified a number of weaknesses in CRIA procedure undermining its effectiveness to predict 
the impact of policy on children and young people’s rights. These include capacity and 
resources issues, limited understanding of CRC obligations amongst officials, and a lack of 
participation by children and young people during the CRIA evidence gathering phase.115 
These issues are discussed in the Welsh Government’s latest compliance report which includes 
a commitment to ensure that officials are trained on the CRC, and to take account of 
recommendations for improvement made in the CRIA evaluation.116 It is too early to comment 
on whether this will result in improvements to the CRIA procedure. However, the due regard 
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duty and the requirement to publish a compliance report means that the effectiveness of CRIA 
and the issues identified in the evaluation, as well as the Welsh Government’s response, have 
been placed in the public domain and will be debated and scrutinised in the NAW (by the 
CYPEC), by CRAG and by other interested stakeholders. 
 
To enhance children and young people’s capacity to engage with available mechanisms to hold 
Ministers (and others) to account for compliance with the CRC the Measure includes a free-
standing duty requiring Ministers to take action to raise awareness and knowledge of the 
principles of the CRC in Wales.117 In order to comply with this duty Ministers have introduced 
a number of initiatives. For example, since 2015 it has funded ‘Young Wales’, a project to 
support consultation with, and participation by children and young people in policy 
development in Wales.118 Other participation and awareness raising activities aimed at children 
and young people supported by the Welsh Government include publication of key policy 
documents in child-friendly format,119 new on-line resources,120 and funding for MEIC, an 
information, advice and advocacy service for children and young people in Wales.121 These 
initiatives contribute toward empowering children and young people to engage in policy in 
Wales, and to take advantage of their rights. There is evidence that this has resulted in new 
meaningful engagements between children and young people and policy-makers.122 However, 
Young Wales and others have identified the lack of opportunities for participation by children 
and young people in policy in Wales at all levels as an ongoing problem.123  
 
Conclusion 
Wales has adopted a primarily normative approach to legal integration of the CRC, without 
abandoning (on conceptual grounds) regulative aspects of legal integration. The Measure 
establishes and encourages normative mechanisms to promote a proactive approach to CRC 
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implementation, and to strengthen advocacy and Ministerial accountability for compliance 
with children and young people’s rights through the work of the NAW, civil society and the 
CCFW, while deploying a regulative device to support accountability via the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the courts. While there has been divergence internally within the UK between 
Wales and other administrations in the UK, the approach in Wales, utilising the due regard 
duty, is well-suited to the contours of Welsh devolution, and in particular the devolution of 
competences in areas touching on social and economic rights under the CRC. However, the 
Measure only merits support if it results in outcomes which better contribute to the realisation 
of children and young people’s rights, and which do not result in lower standards of compliance 
with the CRC in Wales than elsewhere in the UK. In this respect, it would be imprudent to 
draw conclusions too broadly from the preceding discussion on impact, not least because some 
of the initiatives mentioned predate the Measure: the Welsh Government had a long-standing 
commitment to the CRC and had supported a participatory forum for children and young people 
before Young Wales was established.124 But equally it would be artificial to assess the Measure 
distinct from its historical and contemporary policy context: as noted above, it is one amongst 
a number of interconnected mechanisms that support children and young people’s rights in 
Wales. These mechanisms, to which the Measure is an addition, are mutually re-enforcing. A 
reasonable assessment of the Measure at this point in time therefore sees it as having 
strengthened the role of the CRC in Welsh Government policy-making. An interesting 
development in this regard is the adoption of the CRC as a policy framework by a number of 
public bodies in Wales; following the Welsh Government’s lead.125 The Measure has also 
enhanced opportunities for accountability and policy advocacy on CRC implementation. The 
impact of the Measure has therefore been positive for children and young people’s rights in 
Wales. Accordingly, it provides a useful model for others to adopt (and adapt) where the 
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